In an attempt to unite the “Jama’a” (Community) he made an appeal to the congregation in the Mosque. In this address he made clear what his own position
was and what the people might best do to serve Islam:- “Brethren! I am well aware of what you say. Wherefore have I the power to wreak vengeance (on the regicides). The exact position is that the rebels who have invaded (Medina) and killed Uthman still reign supreme in the Capital. How can I overwhelm such
1. Nahj-ul-Balagha, Sermon No. 19j p. 1120. Publishers, Ghulam Ali & Sons, Lahore Edition 1956.
a number and such a considerable force? Beware! The regicides have made your soldiers a pawn in their game. The wild Bedouine and your rampant slaves. have made a common cause with these rebels. The murderers are not outside, but inside, amongst us. They have not gone out of Medina and we are still at their mercy. Do you think that we can overpower them? No, they are beyond our control. Undoubtedly the ghastly tragedy has been perpetrated through sheer folly, and the regicides did not lack support. When the people will take them to task they will be divided into three great sections:-
(1) A party will come into existence that will see eye to eye with us;
(2) The members of the next party that will come into being will be poles apart from us; (3) Another party will be born that will follow neither one line nor the other..
Have patience then until such time as law and order are established, and peace reigns supreme in the country once again. Wait for the time when rights will be restored with ease and facility. Obey my orders. Do not do anything which might break your solidarity and, weakening you, might lead to your ruination. I will try my best to mend and settle things in a pleasant way. Failing this, I will resort to drastic measures. Remember that if a boil is not cured by the application of ointment, it becomes imperative to have an operation, and to amputate the unnecessary part of the diseased limb.”
Ali’s Adherence to Islamic Principles
Ali’s scrupulous adherence to the principles of Islam now began to prove detrimental to his own interests. The masses demanded a scapegoat for the murder of Uthman but Ali could not find any one culprit whom he could justifiably prosecute for the murder. No single person had killed Uthman, it had been an act of mob violence. It had been a mob that had broken into he
palace of Uthman, and done the ghastly deed. Ali’s conscience would not allow him to lay the charge of murder at any one’s door, when he himself was not sure of the real culprit. When Uthman’s wife, Na’ila, who had lost her fingers while defending her husband, was asked to identify the murderers, she replied “Í cannot identify any one. There were several persons who had entered the house. The only person about whom I could be sure was Muhammad, son of the late Caliph Abu Bakr. When Muhammad ibn Abu Bakr was interrogated, he replied, “Certainly I entered Uthman’s palace, but I did not kill him. When I caught hold of his beard, the Caliph’s words ‘Had Abu Bakr been alive this day, he would not have handled me so roughly’, brought remorse to me and I left the palace without committing any crime.”
No definite charge of murder could be brought against any one particular rebel and it is probable that even the rebel mob that had forcibly entered the house of the Old Caliph, did not know the name of the man, or men, who had actually killed Uthman. Nevertheless Ali’s failure to charge any one with the crime began to thin the number of his followers.
The Widening Schism
Ali acted most handsomely after his accession and in the fullest accordance with the Islamic principles, but the people refused his invitation to follow in the footsteps of the Holy Prophet and unite. If Ali erred at all it was on the side of too great a leninency, his anxiety to avoid reprisals against his opponents having its roots in his desire to preserve the unity of Islam. It is possible that his opponents misinterpreted his forbearance as a sign of weakness for, less zealous and less maganimous than he, they were to lose little time before taking up arms against him. The old tribal sectionalism was once again asserting itself; the rift between the parties gaped ever wider and nothing, it seemed, could now avert the
A Clean Sweep
With his position so precarious, Ali now decided to take drastic measures. His first political step, after his assumption of sovereign powers, was to depose all the provincial governors whom Uthman had appointed. This was done partly to pacify the rebels, who continued to hover round the metropolis, partly because the governors had shown themselves palpably lacking in the Islamic virtues, and partly because they had become altogether too powerful. Taking advantage of the weak rule of Uthman, the governors had become almost semi-independent in their own provinces and were therefore in a strong position to defy the new central authority. By making a clean sweep of Uthman’s unpopular relations, Ali hoped to re-assert the supremacy of Medina. It was to prove an imprudent policy.
Appointment of the New Governors
Contrary to the advice of all his well-wishers, Ali dismissed every one of the old governors, replacing them He by men he felt to be loyal to the Medina party. appointed Uthman ibn Hanif to govern Basra, in place of Ibn Amir; he appointed his cousin, Abdullah ibn Abbas to govern the Yemen (Arabia Felix) he appointed Qais ibn Sa’d bin Ubaydah to govern Egypt; he appointed Ummara ibn Shahab at Kufa, to replace Abu Musa, he appointed Sahl ibn Hanif to replace Mu’ awiya, in Syria. Then, by an inexplicable and extraordinarily impolitic stroke Ali went on to support some of his own followers, thereby creating still more implacable foes whose rebellions were to keep him busy for the whole of his reign.
The historian Dozy sums up the general policy as follows:-
“Raised to the Caliphate by the Defenders (Of the Caliph Uthman), Ali now dismissed all Uthman’s governors and replaced them by Muslims of the old school, for the most part also Defenders. The Orthodox party were victorious, and they proceeded to establish themselves in power, to crush the tribal nobility and the Umayyads–those converts of yesterday who aimed at being the Pontiffs and doctors of the morrow.”
From the first, however, the policy met with only limited success. When Ali’s new nominees went to take up their appointments the warmth of their reception varied greatly from province to province. Uth- man’s governor of Basra, Ibn Amir, handed over to Ali’s newly-appointed deputy without any show of resistence and Qais ibn Sa’d was similarly able to instal himself peaceably as governor of Egypt; Ali’s cousi Ibn-al-Abbas took over the government of Yemen with out opposition, but only after his predecessor Yala ib Umayya had escaped to Mecca with all the money tha
Reinhart Dozy Spainish Islam. p. 32 Publishers. Chatto & Windu London Edition, 1913.
the royal treasury of Yemen possessed. In Syria, how-ever, and in Kufa, it was a very different story. When Sahl ibn Hanif got as far as Tabuk, he found a squad of Syrians waiting for him. On hearing that he was the newly-appointed governor they said, “If you were appointed by Uthman, then well and good, but if you are the nominee of some one else, then it would be better that you should return to your master. We do not acknowledge Ali’s authority and have sworn vengeance upon him for the murder of Uthman.” Sahl was thus compelled to return to Medina. Similarly the new governor of Kufa was turned away by a show of force, and he also returned to Medina. The loss of prestige which the flight of both these governors epitomised, greatly perturbed Ali. Forthwith he started negotiations with Abu Musa at Kufa and Mu’awyia at Damascus. Abu Musa temporised while Mu’awyia’s reaction to a request from Alí that he should take the oath of allegiance was an insolent silence. Far from being willing to submit to Ali he now plotted unceasingly to sow discord amongst Ali’s followers and to bring about his downfall.”
Mu’awiya Accuses Ali of Favouritism
With skill and eloquence, Mu’awiya planned a campaign of propaganda against Ali, accusing him of favouritism, of appointing as governors in the provinces only those men who were either related to him or who belonged to the Medinite clique.” Wherein” said Mu’awiya, “lies the difference between Uthman and Ali. Ali has not appointed new governors to suppress the agitation set afoot against Uthman but has built a hulwark of his favourite officers to strengthen himself with a ring of friends.”
Already the fears expressed, first by Moghaira and then by Ibn Abbas, were becoming reality. Ali has made his first serious diplomatic blunder. More were to follow.
Aal-e-Qutub Aal-e-Syed Abdullah Shah Ghazi 